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Abstract 
The Department of Defense is experimenting with how to deliver new capabilities in 2 to 5 years. 
Program offices recognize that they are dependent upon their contractors for successful delivery. 
The MQ-8 Fire Scout started in 1999 and achieved initial operational capability of the MQ-8C in 
2019, after 20 years and effectively three program restarts. After each restart, the contractor 
developed, manufactured, and delivered a functional product deployed by the Navy within 5 years 
of contract award.   
Conventional wisdom says that senior leadership support and customer urgency are critical to 
fast delivery. This study shows how a program office and prime contractor were able to deliver a 
new capability despite changes in procurement objectives, evolving technologies, and 
requirements.   
Results Statements 
This research developed a case study from publicly available sources. This case study highlights 
how intangible assets such as prime contractor employee intellectual capital, goodwill, and a 
sustained corporate interest in strategically positioning for a future market sector are 
complementary to a program’s acquisition strategy and essential to program execution.   
Research Limitations/Implications   
This research used publicly available data from budget submissions, program-related reporting, 
contractor annual reports, and contemporaneous press releases. The findings are specific to the 
Fire Scout program, and suggest that factors previously considered in industrial base arguments 
are relevant to rapid product delivery. 
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Disclaimer 
This material is based upon work supported by the Acquisition Research Program under Grant 
No. HQ00341910004. The views expressed in written materials or publications, and/or made by 
speakers, moderators, and presenters, do not necessarily reflect the official policies of the 
Department of Defense nor does mention of trade names, commercial practices, or organizations 
imply endorsement by the U.S. Government. 
Introduction 
The Department of Defense (DoD) buys products and services collectively described as 
a capability. Acquisition strategies are business plans developed by program offices and 
approved by senior leadership, containing a statement of need for the capability, estimated cost 
and schedule, and the contracting and support plans (General Services Administration, 2019, 
pt. 7). The rate of change of both technology and adversary capabilities is pushing the DoD and 
defense contractors to speed capability development and delivery. MDAP capability 
requirements such as maximum speed, endurance, and payload capacity change over time. 
Programs proceed in phases from program start through program decision and assessment 
gates1 to initial operational capability (IOC).   
This research was part of a 2019 Acquisition Research Program grant study. We 
developed a case study from the 1999 Vertical Take-off and Landing Unmanned Air Vehicle 
(VTUAV) development through the delivery of the MQ-8 Fire Scout in 2019. The development 
and delivery occurred within the context of a defense-unique market defined by the contractor 
and a government stakeholder. Major policy changes enacted during the Fire Scout program 
include the Weapons System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 and the 2016 Section 804 Middle 
Tier of Acquisition2 and had little effect on Fire Scout.   
Contemporaneous news articles and press releases provide the context for Fire Scout 
development. Programmatic information is from contract award data from FPDS.gov and 
publicly released Selected Acquisition Reports.   
The research examined contractor acquisitions and teaming on program outcomes. 
These affect not only market competition by changing the numbers of buyers and sellers, but 
also represent long-term contractor strategies faced with substitute goods, regulation, and 
peripatetic demand3.   
Background 
Northrop Grumman History 
Northrop Grumman has a long history of aviation innovation. The company designed the 
first flying wing bomber in the 1940s, produced lightweight fighters such as the F-5 and target 
drones in the 1960s, and the B-2 stealth bomber in the 1980s. Northrop acquired Vought in 
1992 and Grumman Aerospace in 1994, bringing additional product lines such as the F-14 and 
E-2 into the company and consolidating aerospace market position45. 
 
1 Examples include Engineering and Manufacturing Development, Critical Design Review, and Milestone C 
approval for production and deployment. Most but not all MDAPs have these gates as part of their acquisition 
strategy. 
2 For example, the 2016 National Defense Authorization Section 804 changes requires capability delivery within 5 
years of program start to use these authorities.   
3 Porter (2008) discussed these as market forces. 
4 See https://www.northropgrumman.com/who-we-are/northrop-grumman-heritage/. 
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Today’s Northrop Grumman corporation resulted from a series of strategic acquisitions 
by the former Northrop Corporation beginning in 1992, when the company acquired a 49% 
interest in the Vought Aircraft Company, a designer and builder of commercial and military 
aerostructures. In 1999, Northrop Grumman acquired Ryan Aeronautical from Allegheny 
Teledyne for $140 million. Ryan was a small company of about 300 employees, but was one of 
the national leaders in Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV) development, designing the U.S. Air Force 
Global Hawk and the DARPA Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (Muradian, 1999).   
With the Ryan acquisition, Northrop Grumman had product lines and revenue from 
operational Navy and Air Force drone target and reconnaissance systems, becoming the prime 
contractor (through Ryan) on the Global Hawk, the Miniature Air Launched Decoy and the 
Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle, and now had organic capability to design and produce 
unmanned air systems, and active development and delivery contracts (Kresa, 2001).   
Northrop Grumman also acquired advanced electronics and radar expertise and radar 
contracts with the purchase of Westinghouse Electric Corporation’s defense electronic systems 
group, and information systems expertise by acquiring Logicon, a leading defense information 
technology company. By 2007, Northrop Grumman had established themselves as a key 
supplier of UAV and defense electronic systems. Table 1 provides a summary of Northrop 
acquisitions. 
Table 1. Northrop UAV-Related Acquisition Actions. (Northrop.com). 
Year Company Action Notes 
1992 Vought Aircraft Acquisition Aerostructures manufacture 
1994 Grumman Aerospace Acquisition Aircraft and Apollo Lander expertise, 
F-14 support 
1996 Westinghouse Electric 
Corporation 
Acquisition Defense Electronic Systems Group, 
aircraft radar systems 
1997 Logicon Acquisition Information technology and battle 
management systems 
1998 Inter-National Research 
Institute 
Acquisition Command and Control, data fusion 
expertise 
1998 California Microwave Acquisition Airborne ISR, mission planning 
1999 Teledyne Ryan Aeronautical Acquisition UAV expertise 
2000 Vought Division Sale Divest—metal structures production 
2001 Aerojet General Acquisition Smart Weapons expertise 
2007 Scaled Composites Acquisition Specialty composites and flight test 
expertise 
 
These were part of and in response to the larger consolidation of the defense aerospace 
industry.6 These acquisitions allowed Northrop Grumman to acquire not only production 
contracts, but also the tacit knowledge necessary for creating autonomous unmanned air 
vehicles (UAVs). Northrop Grumman acquired the remainder of Vought Aircraft in August 1994, 
and sold the metal structures expertise to Carlyle Group,7 allowing Northrop Grumman to 
concentrate on composite structures.   
 
6 In 1999, Northrop Grumman noted the intense competition from this consolidation in its annual report to the 
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Merger and Acquisition Literature Overview 
There is extensive literature on corporate mergers and acquisitions. Bertoncelj and 
Kavcic identify three types of corporate relationships, namely ad-hoc teaming, contractual, and 
ownership, and qualitatively characterize these relationships in terms of relative trust, protection, 
control, and learning (Bertoncelj & Kavcic, 2011). In any merger, be it two households or two 
companies, a fundamental issue is what to do with the combined assets. Anand identifies two 
approaches—redistribution or consolidation (Anand, 2004, p. 387).   
Hensel (2016) argued that defense industry consolidations are a response to cost 
pressures on contractor workforce and facilities. Zullo and Liu (2017) described major contractor 
responses to budget reductions as expansion-merger, expansion-diversity, consolidation—focus 
on core or consolidation-specialization. Smaller suppliers, or subprime contractors, tended to 
develop strategies that exploited unique or proprietary capabilities or advantages (Zullo & Liu, 
2017, p. 363). Jackson (2007) adds another strategy, that he calls strategic market positioning, 
where acquisition decisions are enhance an existing competitive advantage. He argues that this 
strategy drove the Northrop Grumman decision to buy Ryan Aerospace in 1999 (Jackson, 
2007). 
Brock (2009) considered the effects of consolidation on contractor economic power, 
arguing that concentration prevents economic efficiency gains passing to the buyer, suppresses 
innovation, restricts buyer choice, and protects sellers from market penalties for poor 
performance. His point is the market acts to limit the power of a single buyer or seller (Brock, 
2009, p. 397).   
A company has tangible and intangible assets. Tangible assets are physical property 
owned by a company, and used to produce a product or service. Intangible assets are non-
physical assets (such as a patent) that create value for the company. Allen (2010) describes 
three classes of intangible assets—intellectual capital, intellectual assets, and intellectual 
property. In her model, intellectual capital represents the employee’s inherent knowledge and 
skill; internal processes, methods, are formulations are intellectual assets; and intellectual 
properties are those intangible assets with legal protections for right of use (Allen, 2010).  
Company annual financial reports reflect intangible assets as goodwill (brand recognition 
and loyalty) or purchased intangible assets (patents, trademarks, and such). Ievdokymov et al. 
(2020) showed that intangible asset value8 is related to company market value and this relation 
is stronger for larger companies (Ievdokymov et al., 2020, p. 169). Bollen et al. (2005) used 
surveys to analyze the relationship between intellectual capital and company9 performance. 
They followed Bonti and used three elements—human, structural, and relationship capital and 
showed statistically significant but indirect relationships between each intellectual capital 
element and aspects of company performance. In particular, they found intellectual property, but 
not the supporting intellectual capital significantly related to company performance (Bollen et al., 
2005, p. 1180). 
The DoD has a renewed emphasis on intellectual property (IP).10 Defense acquisition 
programs are required to have a life cycle IP plan, codified in an new policy requiring intellectual 
property planning throughout a program life cycle for both for acquisition and sustainment, 
balancing DoD technology needs with fair intellectual property owner treatment (Lord, 2019). 
 
8 The conclusions are specific for Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. 
9 Conclusions are specific to the pharmaceutical industry. 
10 DODI 5010.44 defines IP as “Information, products, or services that are protected by law as intangible property, 
including data (e.g., technical data and computer software), technical know-how, inventions, creative works of 
expression, trade names.” 
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A common belief is that vendors use intellectual property to extract economic rents and 
impose switching costs that cause the government not to compete work, called vendor “lock-in.” 
Berardi and Cameron (2019) considered under what conditions software architectures and 
intellectual property rights favor vendor lock-in. They found that open software architectures are 
sufficient to prevent intellectual property or rights-based lock-in (Berardi & Cameron, 2019, pp. 
69–72)   
The Navy and Unmanned Helicopters 
The DoD uses UAVs today for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) 
missions and strike operations (USD AT&L, 2012). Unmanned air vehicles in the military were 
initially used as targets and as weapons and were derived from multiple enabling technologies, 
including propulsion, navigation, and controls (Erhard, 2000).   
The Navy experimented in the 1950s with using shipborne helicopters for airborne anti-
submarine warfare, but shifted to remotely piloted systems fielding the first maritime UAV 
weapons platform, called DASH,11 in 1962. DASH operated from Navy ships until 1971 and 
were commonly used for naval gunfire spotting, surveillance, and torpedo or depth charge 
delivery (Gyrodyne Historical Foundation, 2020). The DASH control system suffered reliability 
and operability problems; controllability was so bad that few personnel could operate the system 
(Erhard, 2000, Chapter 7).   
In 1998, the Navy posted a solicitation to develop an unmanned vertical takeoff and 
landing vehicle (VTUAV). A 1998 Navy press release named several teams intending to bid on 
the solicitation; one was led by Schweizer Aircraft Corporation (Lopez, 1998). At the same time, 
Northrop Grumman was acquiring Ryan Aerospace, a small 300-person company with more 
than 20 years’ history in the development of unmanned aircraft. Northrop Grumman and Ryan 
Aerospace decided to submit a joint bid with Schweizer Aircraft on the VTUAV (Norris, 2003). 
Northrop Grumman and Ryan defined unmanned flight control as the critical development for 
program success. Northrop Grumman bought a Schweizer helicopter in advance of contract 
awards and worked with Ryan to develop a flight control system demonstrator (Norris, 2003).  
The Navy canceled the program in 2002 and restarted the program in July 2003. 
Northrop restructured their efforts, moving prototype demonstrations to Patuxent River, MD, and 
redesigning the prototype for a more powerful engine (Norris, 2006). In July 2005, Northrop 
Grumman conducted flight and live fire testing at Yuma Proving Grounds (Paynter, 2005), and 
demonstrated autonomous landings on USS Nashville (LPD-13) at-sea in January 2006 (Staff 
Writers, 2006).   
Northrop Grumman sought new customers and new roles for the Fire Scout, including 
the Army, Coast Guard, and foreign governments. The Army included Fire Scout in the Future 
Combat System, and procured eight systems before canceling the Future Combat System 
program.12 Other prospects were interested, but generated no additional sales.   
The program office and Northrop Grumman developed a plan to get early production 
systems to the fleet, which would accelerate identification and correction of design and 
employment issues. The Navy canceled procurement of five Littoral Combat Ships between 
2006–2008 (O’Rourke, 2019), resulting in Fire Scout procurement deferrals (Smith, 2013). The 
Fire Scout program reached Milestone C in May 2007, allowing low-rate initial production. On 
December 10, 2008, Fire Scout embarked on USS McInerney (FFG-8) and deployed in 2009 
 
11 Drone Anti-Submarine Helicopter, manufactured by Gyrodyne Company of America. 
12 The Navy converted these systems to fit Navy specifications. 
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(Northrop Grumman, 2009). During the deployment Fire Scouts were used in intercepting drug 
smugglers (Evans, 2014). 
In 2009, Defense Secretary Gates directed cancellation of the Future Combat System 
(Robinson, 2009). In 2011, Fire Scouts deployed with Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron 
Light (HSL) 42 Detachment 2 aboard USS Halyburton (FFG-40; HSL-42, 2011), and provided 
forward observation and targeting over Libya (Axe, 2020).   
According to the 2012 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) the inventory objective was 
168 production systems by 2032 (Dodge, 2013). However, the same SAR shows a two year gap 
in procurement after ordering 23 systems, reportedly to align with Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) 
delays (Dodaro, 2013). The Fire Scout program saw user demand but procurement quantities 
decline. 
Some Key Corporate Actions 
Northrop Grumman had some corporate expertise in unmanned systems with their target 
drone product lines. They did not have extensive vertical flight experience, so they teamed with 
Schweizer Aircraft on the Vertical Takeoff UAV (VTUAV) solicitation. Northrop’s acquisition of 
Ryan Aeronautics immediately them design and production expertise with the Global Hawk and 
Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle UAVs, but also experience with vertical takeoff and landing 
platforms. Combined with prior acquisitions of airborne sensor, command and control, and 
mission planning companies, Northrop had the experience within the company for adapting a 
commercial helicopter into a VTUAV system. 
Northrop Grumman (Ryan) focused on the historical problem with remotely piloted 
systems—flight control (Erhard, 2000). They eliminated significant technical challenges by 
scaling to a proven commercial platform—the Schweizer 330—with known performance 
characteristics. Schweizer had already modified the helicopter and redesigned the transmission 
to accommodate a 420-horsepower turboshaft engine, and developed a 4-blade hub, allowing 
for future growth in lift capacity (Norris, 2006).   
The program office supported Northrop Grumman’s efforts and helped create new 
capabilities. The Navy made significant design choices, including adaptable interfaces and 
payloads, ground systems and datalinks (NAVAIR, 2000), a common launch and recovery 
system, and a ground control system that could operate from land or ships and feed existing 
data networks (Smith, 2013). The Fire Scout was re-designated as a multi-mission platform, and 
in July 2005, a Fire Scout fired rockets during flight testing at Yuma Proving Grounds (Paynter, 
2005). The final variant had increased payload and sensor capacity (Soderberg, 2019).  
Figure 1 shows the acquisition and teaming relationships Northrop Grumman continued 
with commercial helicopter manufacturers after acquiring Ryan, enabling an organizational 
balance of expertise between the platform and the unmanned system. 
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Figure 1. Fire Scout Teaming Arrangements 
Findings 
Fire Scout Budgets and Procurement Objectives 
The Fire Scout budget profiles from 2000 to 2020 show the effects on research and 
development from program cancellation in 2002 and 2012 procurement cuts.13 The two 
procurement budget phases in Figure 2 are related to conversion of Army-configured systems in 
2008 and MQ-8C procurements in 2016. 
 
 
Figure 2. Fire Scout Budget Profiles. (FPDS.gov). 
 
Contract work continued at about this same rate through 2020, in part due to the 
company continuing to develop new capabilities ahead of demand.14 Notwithstanding the 
program office and contractor efforts, the program delivery was limited by funding, the realized 
 
13 Due to Future Combat Ship program reductions, which was to use the Fire Scout in mission packages. 
14 For example, the ability to launch weapons, the upgraded turboshaft engine system, and the adaptation of a new 
airframe to create the larger and more capable MQ-8C. 
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annual production capacity of about six systems per year, and the dependency on other 
acquisition programs.   
Two events affected production quantities. The first was the Army’s 2010 decision to 
cancel MQ-8 procurement plans with the Future Combat System termination. The second was 
the 2011 restructuring of the Littoral Combat Ship program and resulting delay of Fire Scout 
production. The reduction of both ship and mission module inventory objectives reduced 
required buys (Smith, 2013). The loss of Littoral Combat Ship demand contributed to a Nunn–
McCurdy Breach (Smith, 2013). By 2019 the Navy inventory objective was reduced to 68 
platforms (9 development and 59 production) as shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. Cumulative Procurement Quantities. (MQ-8 SARs). 
 
The final SAR showed required  production quantities dropped from 168 in 2013 to 61 in 
2015 (Soderberg, 2019). The red dashed line (2012 SAR data) shows the short-term result of 
the Future Combat System termination and Littoral Combat Ship procurement delay. The blue 
lines (2015 and 2019 SAR data) reflect the reduced procurement quantities (blue lines) to 61 
plus 9 developmental units (Dodge, 2015) resulting from the decision to truncate Littoral Combat 
Ship procurements.   
Northrop Grumman Impacts 
Northrop Grumman is a diversified technology company, with multiple government and 
commercial customers. Contract award data between 1977 and 2020 shows obligations to 
Northrop Grumman in 200 different Product and Service Codes (PSCs). The Navy had the most 
overall contract activity with Northrop Grumman, in part due to Northrop Grumman shipyard 
ownership.   
Figure 4 shows Northrop Grumman government-reported obligations for specific aviation 
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Figure 4. Northrop Grumman Obligations by Date Signed for Aviation PSCs. (FPDS.gov). 
 
The figure highlights Northrop Grumman’s base aircraft and airframe work activity, and 
shows the significant and increasing work in these areas in all services. While Northrop 
Grumman provided drone and unmanned systems and support to all services, the Navy had a 
long-term relationship covering multiple platforms, including Fire Scout early and later Triton (a 
Global Hawk variant). The drone and unmanned aircraft work (purple and grey triangles in 
Figure 2) became important after 2000.   
The results of Northrop Grumman’s strategy to establish a market position in unmanned 
air systems are shown by contract award data. Northrop Grumman earned twice the revenue on 
Fire Scout related contract work as other performers. The Ryan acquisition cost was recovered 
in 5 years and was a steady revenue source for the next 15 years as shown in Figure 5.   
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In 1998 Northrop Grumman had one flagship aircraft acquisition program—the E-2 
Hawkeye. By 2018, unmanned air systems had become major acquisition programs with annual 
budgets exceeding $1 billion per year. After years of strategic acquisitions and sustained 
activity, Northrop Grumman was one of the major unmanned air systems (the Global 
Hawk/Triton) manufacturers for the Department of Defense as shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Selected Major Weapons System Summary 
System Name 1998 ($M) 2018 ($M) NOC 
AH-64 Longbow Apache (C/D/E/reman) 609.2 1,441.9 Sub 
E-2 Hawkeye (C//D) 374.8 1,116.4 Prime 
F-18 Hornet (E/F) //Super Hornet 3274.6 1,253.1 Sub 
B-2 Spirit 307.6 0 Prime 
E-8 JSTARS 850.3 0 Prime 
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter//Lightning II 909.1 10,837.9 Sub 
V-22 Osprey 985.1 961.8 Sub 
F-15 Eagle 274.8 963.1 Sub 
F-22 Raptor 2,406.5 915.5 Sub 
C-130 Hercules 0 886.1 Sub 
P-8 Poseidon 0 1,609.4 Sub 
MQ-1 Predator UAS 0 174.4 * 
RQ-4 Global Hawk UAS 0 1,282.3 Prime 
MQ-9 Reaper UAS 0 1,009.8 * 
UAV Smaller UAVs 0 129.7 * 
 
Northrop Grumman was the prime contractor of four systems in Table 2—the E-2, B-2, 
E-8, and RQ-4. Only acquired programs were receiving production funding in 2018. Northrop 
Grumman’s long-term acquisition strategy helped them remain a significant military aircraft 
producer. 
Discussion 
The Department of Defense is experimenting with how to deliver new capabilities in 2 to 
5 years. Conventional wisdom says that senior leadership support and customer urgency are 
critical to fast delivery. This case study shows how contractor decisions and actions satisfying 
long-term strategic interests of the company affected program office success. 
The program started in 1999 as the VTAUV and achieved initial operational capability as 
the MQ-8C in 2019, after 20 years of change and several programmatic restarts and changes. 
The Navy and Northrop Grumman were able to sustain program progress despite adversities 
such as program defunding in 2002, loss of a customer in 2008, and early operational 
deployments.   
Northrop Grumman’s long-term strategy to acquire a market presence in unmanned air 
systems aligned with the program office objectives. Their strategy ensured that the people with 
the experience and understanding to address the critical technical needs behind emerging 
government requirements. They anticipated government requirements evolution. Northrop 
Grumman and the program office kept finding new user bases and made critical adjustments to 
satisfy operational requirements. They transformed assets built for the Army Future Combat 
System into Navy assets, and deployed them for operational use. The sustained emphasis on 
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operational use and future markets created confidence in system capabilities and identified new 
modifications meeting emerging needs. 
The MQ-8 Fire Scout remains an unusual program. Navy program office and contractor 
tenacity and complementary objectives mattered in final program outcomes. This study shows 
how a program office and prime contractor were able to mature and deliver a new capability 
despite changes in procurement objectives, evolving technologies, and requirements. The 
Program Office benefitted from Northrop’s experience and willingness to assume risk. Early field 
deployment and operational is a high-risk, potentially high-reward strategy. The Navy and 
Northrop Grumman had to respond when systems failed or were lost in combat (Axe, 2020). 
This required extraordinary dedication, but resulted in an extraordinary record of development 
and delivery—in the face of adversity. 
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